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Counting and Commodifying 
Kieran Healy  
INTRODUCTION 
In her article Testing as Commodification,
1
 Katharine Silbaugh 
notes that ―the standards-and-testing debate [in Education] mimics 
many familiar concerns from the commodification debate within 
philosophy and law . . . [but with] an interesting variation because 
tests scores play the role that prices do in the commodification 
literature.‖2 She asks whether the sort of controversies we see around 
commodification arise from the market per se or whether they are a 
feature of common metrics of any sort. Her claim is that 
―commodification anxiety does not depend on markets but rather on 
the unifying force of single metrics.‖3 She goes on to give a brief 
account of the standards-based reform movement in U.S. education 
that culminated in the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001.
4
 
The act mandated that schools make ―adequate yearly progress‖ 
(AYP) as measured by some standardized tests,
5
 and Silbaugh is 
concerned about the potentially perverse effects of this requirement. 
The ―corruption risk‖ familiar from debates on commodification is 
―robust and visible in anxieties about education reform‖6 because of 
the way in which standardized tests take the supposedly 
comprehensive, multifaceted process of ―education‖ and reduce it to 
measured performance on a couple of standardized tests of reading 
and mathematics. 
 
 
 Associate Professor in Sociology and the Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University. 
 1. Katharine Silbaugh, Testing as Commodification, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309 
(2011). 
 2. Id. at 311. 
 3. Id. at 316. 
 4. Id. at 317–18. 
 5. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7325 (2002). 
 6. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 316. 
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The core idea of the article is that testing is like commodification 
because 
[o]ne set of values are measurable, are measured, and can be 
made commensurable, and another set of values are not or 
cannot be placed on a metric. Rather than simply describing 
the world, this phenomenon places pressure to re-design the 
world so that we place our energies behind only what is 
measured. Here the need to make items commensurable leads 
to a worse result than a simple failure to describe the character 
of the good in question (education) by placing that good on a 
common metric. It actually transforms the character of the 
item. The description is self-fulfilling: education becomes the 
thing we have tools to measure about education.
7
 
The result, Silbaugh argues, is that  
schools across the country have adapted their curricula to focus 
on subjects that are tested by reducing the time spent on 
subjects that are not a part of the testing program, such as 
social studies, and ones that are not susceptible to standardized 
testing at all, such as music, art, and physical education.
8
  
All of these tend to be left in the wake of the pressure to ―teach to the 
test.‖9 
This is a suggestive article that brings together two controversial 
topics—the effects of the market as an institution and the perennial 
crisis in American schools—each with its own gigantic field of 
discourse. In response, I will briefly lay out three possible responses: 
first, that testing is not really commodification; second, that perhaps 
testing is not such a bad thing; and third, that it may be a mistake to 
think of certain subjects or practices as intrinsically unquantifiable. 
While the first two points are critical of the main thesis of Silbaugh’s 
article, the third suggests that the phenomenon she identifies may be 
even more general than the article implies. 
 
 7. Id. at 325. 
 8. Id. at 324. 
 9. Id. at 323. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/16
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TESTING IS NOT REALLY COMMODIFICATION 
First, and most straightforward, we could argue that standardized 
testing is not all that much like commodification. It is true that in 
both cases something is being counted and measured. Because of this, 
testing and commodification are interestingly similar (I return to this 
point below). On the other hand, test scores are not (legally) for sale, 
nor are high-scoring pupils directly bought and sold on a market.
10
 
Instead, the idea is that by requiring that schools make sure children 
can pass a couple of standardized tests, we narrow or ―thin out‖ our 
conception of education to the detriment of schools and students, and 
this thinning-out of value is analogous to what is supposed to happen 
when certain goods are exchanged only with regard to the price they 
can command as commodities on a market. So the point of 
comparison is that both processes involve the quantification of value 
with, Silbaugh argues, similarly pernicious consequences.
11
 
 
 10. Assistance with standardized tests is for sale, as evidenced by the large test-prep and 
tutoring industry. And the college admissions process certainly encourages students and parents 
to think of SAT scores (and grades and AP courses) in a strongly instrumental manner, as part 
of the ―price‖ that needs to be paid in order to get admitted to a good school. But this 
instrumental attitude also extends to those parts of the process that are deliberately 
unquantified, such as the Personal Statement and the slate of extracurriculars one has to show. 
 11. Some education systems do encourage the commodification of test scores in a more 
direct way. In the United States, students compete for admission to particular schools, with 
one’s major to be determined later. In Ireland, by contrast, competition is effectively for places 
in particular degree courses (law, arts, medicine, engineering, etc.) at various universities. The 
problem is that demand for some courses is high: there may not be enough places in courses 
like medicine, for instance, to meet demand. Ireland’s solution is a points system. Grades in the 
national Leaving Certificate examinations taken by graduating high school students correspond 
to numerical point values, with so many points for an A, so many for a B, and so on. See CENT. 
APPLICATIONS OFFICE, CAO HANDBOOK 2011, at 19–20, available at http://www2.cao.ie/ 
handbook/handbook/hb.pdf. Students apply to college courses in advance of their exams, 
indicating an ordered preference ranking. Id. at 21. Based on their exam performance, each 
student ends up with a certain number of points. Id. at 20. The availability of seats in courses 
and the demand for them jointly determine the number of points necessary for admission to 
each course. See id. at 22. Higher demand courses require more points. Courses with low 
demand—due either to low demand or a large number of seats on the supply side—require 
fewer points. Id. The system is effectively a queue conditioned on student preferences with 
admission to the limited number of seats in a degree course based solely on exam performance 
and, in cases of ties, a random component. However, a consequence of the system—one 
publicly recognized and often counseled against—is a tendency to think of one’s total number 
of points as an amount of money one has the opportunity to spend. See id. at 23. ―Spending‖ it 
wisely is sometimes thought to mean spending all of it: that is, a student who expects to score 
560 points should not ―waste‖ them by choosing a course expected to ―cost‖ 300 points. The 
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Considered solely from the point of view of organizational 
sociology, the imposition of the AYP mandate can be seen as an 
instance of how floors become ceilings. Supporters of the mandates 
in NCLB, and of standardized testing generally, would be foolish to 
claim that their measure provides a perfect assessment of everything 
a well-rounded education should provide. Instead, a standardized test 
is more like a floor or a baseline. Everyone should reach the basic 
standard and then, in the normal course of events, go on to exceed it 
or develop in some other direction as all of the other valuable aspects 
of a successful education are incorporated alongside it. Perhaps there 
is some ideal ceiling of success, but this is not necessary. 
A difficulty with this sort of approach is that the rule defines a 
threshold and, because monitoring or punishment is only activated 
when one falls below it, absent other incentives or values actors only 
have reason to meet the standard, not beat it. Characterizing the 
problem of ―teaching to the test‖ frames it as an unwanted 
consequence of requiring compliance to a measured standard, rather 
than the result of some commodifying tendency as such. It does not 
require that what is being tested be intrinsically amenable to 
quantification, either—just that there be a test. As long as there is 
some assessment mechanism and a punishment for failing to meet it, 
we should expect to see a similar tendency. For instance, regulatory 
authorities might decide that schools had to make sure pupils were 
well-drilled in the ability to sink a three-pointer from the baseline, the 
adequate production of a small wooden table, or the proper execution 
of a Windsor knot. In these cases educators might try to ensure that 
students were able to accomplish the chosen tasks in a reliable way, 
even if this happened at the expense of acquiring any real ability to 
play basketball, craft furniture, or plausibly engage in conversation at 
a society wedding. Requiring that some baseline standard be met 
opens the door to the slavish targeting of that standard for its own 
sake (especially if resources or employment are on the line). The 
 
result is pressure to express a preference for the ―highest-price‖ course one might be admitted 
to, instead of one’s genuine preference. This is a case, I think, where we can see Margaret 
Radin’s ideas about the consequences of thinking of goods in market-like terms, even when 
those things are not truly commodities for sale. See MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES (1996). But the U.S. education system is not run in this way. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/16
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calcification of rules and standards in this way—in Max Weber’s 
terms, the detachment of substantively rational action from 
instrumentally rational action—was one of the earliest discoveries in 
the study of bureaucratic organization, and it does not depend on any 
market- or commodity-like qualities of testing.
12
 
Moreover, as Carol Heimer has observed, it is much easier to 
make a rule that defines a floor no one is allowed to break than it is to 
craft a rule that encourages people to reach for some higher level of 
achievement or compliance, even when it is the higher level of 
responsibility or achievement that you want to encourage.
13
 In these 
circumstances (which are very common and obviously relevant to the 
case of education), we are left with much less general methods for 
encouraging people to live up to the moral demands of their role. 
Theorists tend to characterize successful cases with empirically 
accurate but seemingly oxymoronic terms such as ―flexible 
precision.‖14 The general problem is related to what is sometimes 
called the paradox of professional discretion: In one sense, being a 
professional means expertly applying general standards without fear 
or favor and without bias. On the other hand, however, professional 
expertise also involves the capacity to judge (or treat, evaluate, or 
educate) particular cases with respect to their unique features and 
circumstances. As a result, professionals often have broad discretion 
about how to best apply general standards or rules to specific cases. 
This is part of what professional authority is about, but it also (in 
some cases) amounts to professionals having the de facto power to 
interpret or make policy as they go along.
15
 Rules that remove this 
discretion may have unexpectedly negative consequences on 
outcomes. 
The situation is complex because professional authority is 
obviously not a guarantor of beneficial results. In some settings, the 
strict enforcement of an almost mechanical adherence to baseline 
 
 12. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (enlarged ed. 1968) 
(discussing goal displacement). 
 13. Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health Care: Spanning the Boundary Between 
Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 465, 475–80 (2006). 
 14. Id. at 490. 
 15. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1983). 
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standards can have very positive outcomes.
16
 For our purposes, the 
point is simply that these phenomena are characteristic of complex 
organizations staffed by professionals attempting to achieve goals 
which are easy to state in general terms (―Provide a good education,‖ 
―Cure the patient,‖ ―Deliver passengers safely‖) but which may 
require a lot of expert judgment at any particular moment. Attempts 
to channel effort through rules or standards can cause problems that 
do not stem from the kind of phenomena (such as crowding out, 
thinning out of values, etc) associated with commodification and 
perverse incentives. 
TESTING MIGHT NOT BE SO BAD 
A second response to the article is that testing might not be such a 
bad thing. If we believe that schools and school performance are 
central to the allocation of persons to positions in the social structure, 
then we should care about the criteria that institutions use to make 
that allocation. Standardized tests do have the virtue, in principle, of 
being immune to the whims of particular assessors and prejudices. 
Anyone working in the social reproduction tradition of education will 
remind you of how supposedly nuanced judgment about virtues such 
as creativity, leadership, open-mindedness, brilliance, self-
expression, self-confidence, and so on, can be made and interpreted 
in rather different ways when conditioned on the relative social 
position of the assessor and assessed.
17
 Consider, as one example 
among many, Pierre Bourdieu’s work fishing out the report cards of 
French students from the provinces and finding the children of 
parents in middle- to lower-status occupations damned with the faint 
praise of their teachers for being ―precise‖ or ―hard-working‖ or 
―conscientious‖—each apparent compliment a kiss of death in a 
system where a fluid, seemingly effortless brilliance is valued above 
all.
18
 
 
 16. This is especially true in situations where tasks are complex and crucial steps are 
easily overlooked even by experienced professionals. In such circumstances, the mandatory use 
of checklists can produce better outcomes more consistently than the expert judgment of 
professionals. See, e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2009). 
 17. PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 194–225 (1988). 
 18. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/16
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This point has its limits. We know from the work of social 
psychologists that standardized tests are not immune to these kind of 
biases, in part because of the terrific degree of legitimacy they have 
qua objective instruments to measure intelligence or aptitude. This 
legitimacy is quickly absorbed by students in ways that can make 
them perform worse than they would have if they simply believed it 
to be a straightforward task rather than a scientific measure of their 
IQ.
19
 But given that informal (and unmonitored) assessments have 
their own problems, the next move is not to call (à la Ivan Illich) for 
the wholesale de-chooling of society.
20
 Rather, some assessment still 
needs to be done: ―Any good educator needs to assess regularly what 
her students are learning. Those who object to the education reform 
movement still acknowledge the importance of some assessment to 
understand what gains students are making.‖21 The temptation, 
though, is to avoid the problem by calling for a move to what is in 
essence a fantasy of a modern educational system staffed by teachers 
who are always flexibly precise in their judgment. 
QUANTIFICATION AND VALUE 
A third response to the article is to deny the suggestion that one 
set of values or goals in education is by its nature quantifiable, and 
thereby ends up instantiated in standardized tests, whereas other sorts 
of values are not. Silbaugh’s article equivocates a little on this point, 
sometimes suggesting this stronger view—that there are vital 
educational values that cannot be quantified
22—and sometimes 
 
EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (2d ed. 1990). 
 19. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995); Jean-
Claude Croizet et al., Stereotype Threat Undermines Intellectual Performance by Triggering a 
Disruptive Mental Load, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 721, 728 (2004); Gregory 
M. Walton & Steven J. Spencer, Latent Ability: Grades and Test Scores Systematically 
Underestimate the Intellectual Ability of Negatively Stereotyped Students, PSYCHOL. SCI. 1132 
(2009). 
 20. IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1970). 
 21. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 326. 
 22. See, e.g., id. at 329. 
Examples of educational values that are in a similar, untestable zone are easy to find. 
Schools cannot test team-building behavior, problem-solving, attitude, adaptability, 
motivation, curiosity, situation sense, flexibility, leadership, ethics, open-mindedness, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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suggesting just that these values are not quantified by present tests, 
and so get ignored.
23
 The stronger view is certainly a very common 
trope in the commodification literature, and it finds an echo here in 
the claim that ―it is difficult to argue that this commensurability has 
not corrupted the character of the [good of education] . . . since we 
began forcing schools to measure and compare along a common 
metric,‖24 especially for those things ―that are not susceptible to 
standardized testing at all, such as music, art, and physical 
education.‖25 On this characterization, the problem then is to explain 
why, ―[i]f alternative values are just that—values—why can’t they 
stand up to market norms or testing norms? Why do markets (tests) 
extinguish plural conceptions of personhood (and education)?‖26 
It would appear, however, that standardized measures in many of 
these areas are quite conceivable and in some cases actively 
measured in American schools right now. For instance, I was 
somewhat surprised when my kindergarten-going daughter returned 
home last year with an official form indicating that her physical 
fitness had been assessed according to a national standard. The form 
showed the expected performance range for a child of her age, 
together with her own efforts at running some long distance, doing a 
certain number of repetitive exercises, or jumping up and down in 
some rationalized fashion. As for art and music, like many others I 
was put through six or seven grades of a formally assessed and 
numerically measured program in piano, though to no great effect on 
my musicianship. 
The point is that there is no shortage of quantified assessment 
tools—including tools standardized against a population—across the 
entire range of school-age activities. Neither is there any shortage of 
experts to administer them. The questions are what sort of tests are at 
the core of the system and why do they take the particular form they 
 
patience, compromise, conflict-resolution, or self-expression. But many agree that 
children need to develop these capacities to be happy, good, and successful 
individuals, citizens, and workers in their adult lives.  
Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 325. 
 25. Id. at 324. 
 26. Id. at 332. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/16
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do? The test instruments themselves need not be any good. What 
matters is that such tests are accepted as legitimate even by those who 
try to game them. 
REVISITING ―EDUCATION AS AN INSTITUTION‖ 
These considerations move us toward some of the broader issues 
raised in Silbaugh’s article. The American education system has been 
in crisis or facing some central challenge or in need of some sort of 
fundamental reform for a very long time. And yet, social 
reproduction seems to continue unabated. Children graduate from 
schools and colleges with credentials that, while they may be 
privately decried as being of lower quality than in the past, are 
nevertheless accepted as central to the workings of the rest of society. 
What are we to make of this? 
John Meyer attacked this problem in a classic paper written 
almost thirty years ago, on ―The Effects of Education as an 
Institution.‖27 For Meyer, a key feature of modern education systems, 
and modern society generally, is the tension between two features of 
social organization: equal individuals and unequal roles.
28
 On the one 
hand, there is the principle that everyone is an equal member of the 
national community, with various rights and competencies enabling 
participation in the national community. ―Mass education creates a 
whole series of social assumptions about the common culture of 
society and thus expands the social meaning of citizenship, 
personhood, and individuality (modern ideas, all). It establishes a 
whole series of common elements for everyone.‖29 
On the other hand, some people, or rather some roles, are 
endowed with legitimate, specialized, and credentialed competencies 
and authority: 
 We take too narrow a view if we see this process as 
involving only a few specialized occupations. The most 
important rules concerning credentials are more general: the 
set of rules which connect the educational status of college 
 
 27. John W. Meyer, The Effects of Education as an Institution, 83 AM. J. SOC. 55 (1977). 
 28. Id. at 68–69. 
 29. Id. at 69. 
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graduate (and high school graduate) with all sorts of formal 
and informal elite positions. These rules define a generalized 
body of elite knowledge and specify its legitimate carriers.
30
 
One consequence of this cultural system is a widespread obsession 
with establishing and justifying the conditions for mobility 
opportunities, the disparity in rewards associated with various 
occupations and roles, and the proper measurement of talent in order 
to justify rewards and punishments. From this point of view, both the 
move toward standardized testing for mathematics and language and 
the seemingly ―alternative‖ set of values oriented toward a vision of 
educated people as equally competent citizens with the technical and 
moral capacities to be full members of a national community (and, 
more generally, a universal humanity) are not really separate at all. 
They are often in tension but not because the former is amenable to 
methods of quantification that gobble up, thin out, or render invisible 
the latter. Rather, they long have been part of a much more general 
system of cultural commitments that grounds education as an 
authoritative institution in society, where concerns about authentic 
educational values focus on the principle of universal civic equality 
and agency, and efforts to test and measure ability reflect the need to 
account for differentiation and inequality among a society of nominal 
equals. ―In this way,‖ Meyer remarked, ―expanded modern 
educational systems function as a personnel theory in society, 
justifying in modern cultural terms the expansion and specialization 
of modern elites.‖31 
CONCLUSION 
These more general questions are not just a matter of emphasizing 
that modern education systems help produce a lot of inequality. 
Rather, Meyer’s work is relevant because it suggests a way to see the 
rise of standardized testing and the concern with a more rounded 
education as two aspects of a single general cultural process. I have 
suggested that this might be a useful way to think about some of the 
 
 30. Id. at 68. 
 31. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol35/iss1/16
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tensions that continually plague debate about public education in the 
United States. On the narrower question of the relationship between 
testing and commodification, I have argued that those aspects of 
testing of most interest in Silbaugh’s critique might not be all that 
strongly related to the process of commodification as such. The 
perverse consequences of quantification that she describes are well-
known features of bureaucratic administration and not just market-
like phenomena that testing only recently introduced to the education 
system. The general problem is not so much the consequences of 
treating something like a commodity but rather the process of 
developing and successfully legitimating particular tools for the 
measurement of some valued good or outcome. 
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